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from certain and taken altogether, the short judicial tenure, the partial replacement of judges every three years and the discretionary power of Member States to renew the mandate of their national judge are a source of major discomfort: they undermine the principle of independence in judicial appointments and are a source of instability in the daily workings of the Court ( §4).
However, within the precinct of the Court itself, the Court strives to safeguard and develop impartiality, and we argue that the principle of collegiality in judicial decision making allows the Court's culture of independence to grow in an organic fashion ( §5). Judges are careful not to rely on references to their own legal culture in their decision-making process, and not just within the judgment. Collegiality as a constitutive value is a safeguard of independence as much as it facilitates the development of a common discourse within which individual decisions will be made. We conclude that against this background, the development of legal principles is no worse than can reasonably be expected; that the judges display considerable independence within the constraints placed upon the Court. Judicial reform with more ambition is needed for the Court to claim a sense of belonging to the European people rather than to their nations.
§2. INSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEES OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE
Judicial legitimacy commonly refers to the acceptance of a court's impartiality and competence by the parties, society at large and, in the context of the Court, domestic jurisdictions. This acceptance arises on the basis of various factors, such as the selection of judges, their independence and the reasoning supporting the Court's judgments. As way of background to our analysis, we now consider the protection given to judicial independence. blatantly in a way which is not directly connected to the merits of his or her judicial decisions, and this has never happened until today. Guarantees are thus in place to ensure the imperviousness of European Court judges to external intervention or pressure from other European institutions in the exercise of their judicial office. 6 Whilst dismissal is practically impossible, it may be possible to sideline some judges (and promote others) by allocating the most sensitive cases to certain judges at the expense of others. Whilst the practice of assignment differs between the Court (as a judicial body) and the General Court, some mechanisms act as basic safeguards against some possible internal abuse of power, in the shape of case assignment being considered at the regular General
Meeting of the Court (as a judicial body) and in the form of a published rota between judges at the General Court. 7 As elsewhere, the distinction between an administrative action and a purely adjudicative action may be blurred at times, particularly regarding the increased managerial responsibilities upon judges relating to caseload and case assignment. For present purposes it suffices to note the European Parliament resolution (29 April 2015) recommending the reorganisation of the institution 'in such a way as to make a clearer separation between legal and administrative functions.' 8 Modest though the statement is, it refers to matters of judicial governance and leadership over the organisation of the judiciary, which will influence its susceptibility to external influence. Such matters include the drive for efficiency and economy common to all European institutions: the Court has had to do more 6 Those guarantees make it 'wholly unfounded' to claim that the Court's independence is undermined on that the ground that the Court is itself an EU institution, see The functions of the Court's General Meeting are discussed below, Section 3.1. In both Courts, important cases are sent to the Grand Chamber (15 judges) in order to promote uniformity in the interpretation ofEU law. In other cases, assignment is considered at the general meeting of the Court (as a judicial body) and the decision belongs to the President of the Court, see cases pending before the General Court. For several years, the number of cases disposed of by the General Court was lower than the number of new cases, and so the number of pending cases was constantly rising. But under the Court's proposal, it looked as though some countries, but not others, would be able to nominate two judges at the General Court, and this prompted, within Council, some discussion of how some judges would be appointed on merit rather than purely by nationality. By 2014, Council had been unable to agree on the rotation mechanism necessary for the 2011 proposal to be approved. While some Member States insisted on having a permanent extra judge, others, such as France for example, were quite willing to agree on a rotation of judges between Member States. A document from Council noted in 2014 that 'it was impossible to overcome differences as to the method of appointment of additional Judges.' Member States are likely to either advocate for their candidate to be part of a designated specialist chamber or be the specialist judge in a designated area, or they will aim for their candidates not to be part of a particular chamber. It is one thing to informally and from time to time assign cases judges who has gained expertise in one area, quite another step to develop specialised chambers within a generalist jurisdiction. It may not be a surprise, then, that the General Court itself has opposed such development.
There is a further important difference between the selection of domestic and As in many European countries too, there is a principle of continuity, i.e., that the same judge should stay with the case.
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Balancing the case load takes the form of allocating cases to the judge available rather than weighting the case as can be done in some countries. 33 It seems difficult to fairly spread the weight of the caseload between judges if one does not know who stays at the Court, who is about to leave and who, or how experienced, the newcomer will be. It also seems difficult to make good use of the experience accumulated by judges. In that respect, the instability at the General Court has been repeatedly emphasised. This doesn't exclude the possible transfer of a case from one judge to another to rebalance the workload. 33 Relevant to this balancing exercise are listing reviews in order to equalise work, introduce greater flexibility and reduce waiting time. We would argue that there are still reasons for not publicizing the names of the dissenters (and anonymous dissent is permissible in other courts such as the WTO appellate body): the need to ensure a post-bench career without fear of government interference and the need to ensure a uniform and consistent approach to European law for the purpose of facilitating the application, by domestic courts, of the Court's rulings. 
A. THE GENERAL MEETING OF THE COURT
The best illustration of collegiality at work is the weekly general meeting of the Court of Justice (as a judicial body). After the parties make their written submissions to the Court, the Judge-Rapporteur will prepare a preliminary report on the cases that need to be determined and present it to the General Meeting of the Court, which comprises all members of the Court including the Advocates General. The Judge-Rapporteur will propose the formation to which the case should be assigned and the Court in its general meeting will decide, after hearing the designated Advocate General, the assignment of the case. The French judge Garapon said that 'to grasp a culture thus involves one in trying to formulate what is so obvious for the members that 'it goes without saying'. Our interpretation of collegiality goes against the view commonly heard but not evidenced, that too many judges are 'captured' by their legal secretaries because -for example -the judges do not fluently speak the working language of the Court (French) and therefore they give too much discretion to their legal secretaries in drafting the judgment. While it is difficult to establish evidence of our understanding of collegiality, we expect our interpretation to operate to some substantial degree. Thus, at the end of a lengthy discussion with a member of the Court about various rules of procedures, that member added, jokingly: "and the worst is the principle of collegiality", in the sense that you must listen to your colleagues' arguments and seek consensus or a compromise even though you may be deeply convinced that your own way of thinking should prevail. Collegiality will be chilled by a lack of responsiveness to the opinions of your colleagues.
Fourth, collegiality also supports unity in diversity. When it comes to textual interpretation, collegiality implies extracting an autonomous European meaning out of a commonly used legal term among various Member States. This requires a certain detachment from one particular legal culture within the deliberation as much as the ability to acknowledge the diversity of legal solutions to a particular problem -a diversity that greatly increased following with the successive enlargements of the Union. National references are only accepted when absolutely needed, that is, when it happens that a legal question is settled by the case law or a particular statute in one's own country and it isn't settled in EU law. In that case, then references to the reasons for a particular solution available in a specific Member State would be considered. This then explains that the Court's judgments avoid openly linking a particular interpretation of the law to a particular legal system. Koen
Lenaerts similarly cites collegiality as a fundamental constraint upon the Court's form of judicial reasoning. Some have argued that governments could seek to appoint judges who share their ideological orientation, and that the collegiate structure encourages the Court to make '"majoritarian" rulings-i.e., rulings that reflect the views of judges appointed by a majority of Member State governments'. 57 Our contention, however, is that collegiality will moderate individual ideological or policy preferences. Collegiality is a matter of rational choice, as judges are 'locked into intricate webs of interdependence where the impulse to speak in a personal voice must always be balanced against the need to act collectively in order to be effective'. 58 This is not to decry the criticisms of the well-known brevity of the Court's judgments.
There may be greater need for expert discussion of the implications of some cases, and some cases may not greatly assist domestic judges in their resolution of a dispute. Our argument has instead been that the principle of collegiality does, and should, apply as a necessary corollary of judicial independence and judicial impartiality.
§6. CONCLUSIONS
This article has demonstrated how the judicial selection, appointment and renewal processes deeply constrain and influence decision making processes at the Court of Justice. It is often said that the creation of the Court was only hesitantly accepted, 59 but this falls short of a justification for the damaging impact caused by a short tenure period combined with the permanent triennial renewal of sitting judges at the Court of Justice. We have argued, first, that those institutional constraints constitute a fundamental source of instability at the Court of Justice and, second, that the discretion left to Member States for renewal is a concern for judicial independence. Some may suggest that the instability is more pronounced at the General Court than at the Court and that in practice, in many cases, judges and advocate generals are re-appointed. This would however miss the point that the Court as a whole needs long-term stability to function properly and with convincing authority. Further, the 'overall' benevolent use, in practice, of the Member States' discretionary power to renew an appointment at the Court of Justice doesn't, in itself, guarantee an independent process of 57 renewal. In answer to those issues, Treaty revision towards one single judicial mandate would be our preferred remedy but it is unlikely to happen. So our first recommendation, considering the need for stability and greater independence, has been that Member States should expressly begin any appointment process in the General Court with a perspective of two terms of office mandates.
More broadly, this article has examined the current stronghold of Member States on the judicial selection process. Unlike other international courts, the Court's primary interlocutors are domestic jurisdictions, and we have suggested a greater emphasis on judicial experience of any kind from nominated candidates, or that domestic judges be encouraged to act as legal secretaries, in order to address the concern that the Court's rulings must hit the Against all institutional constraints considered in this article, the principle of collegiality can be seen as an internal reaction within the Court to ensure independence in case allocation, impartiality in difficult cases, and as a means towards a jurisprudence that is not too closely based on the legal culture or traditions of any particular Member State. But this latter concern does mean that some judgments may appear to be compromises, and more radical reform will be needed for those who hanker after clearer and bolder decisions. The proposals outlined in that article, taken together, would likely cause a culture change at the Court. Collegiality should still apply, but the style of judgments may themselves start to become more open and increase the reach of those judgements within domestic jurisdictions.
More ambitious judicial reforms can only succeed with in mind a single, non-renewable term of office, without any triennial renewal of the Court membership. Only then we can hope for an unequivocal answer to our initial interrogation about the Court's belonging.
